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This paper analyzes the stabilizing properties of alternative monetary policy regimes. In 
practice there is a choice between two broad types of monetary policy regimes: a fixed 
exchange rate regime or a floating exchange rate regime. In this paper I compare exchange 
rate targeting with different floating exchange rate regimes: strict price level targeting, 
flexible price level targeting and output gap targeting. The paper also evaluates the actual 
choice of monetary policy regime for seven countries with a pure floating exchange rate 
regime. In most cases the actual regime can be described as flexible price level targeting. 
The results suggest that flexible and strict price level targeting gives lower real and nominal 
variability than both exchange rate targeting and output gap targeting.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last years, several countries have abandoned a fixed or managed exchange rate 
regime and instead shifted to a new monetary policy regime with a pure floating 
exchange rate. For most countries, this new regime is associated with the central bank’s 
discretionary use of the interest rate in order to steer the economy directly toward price 
stability, in the sense of low and stable inflation. Such a framework, often referred to as 
inflation targeting, has been formally introduced in several countries. It was pioneered 
by New Zealand in 1990 and then followed by Canada in 1991, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Australia in 1993, Brazil in 1998, Chile and the Czech Republic in 1999, 
Poland, South Africa and Switzerland in 2000 and Norway and Iceland in 2001. In 
practice, it is generally accepted that these regimes are characterized by a flexible 
inflation target: the central bank tries to stabilize inflation, but also puts some weight on 
stabilizing other variables, such as output.  
This leads to several interesting questions: What are the stabilizing properties of 
alternative monetary policy regimes?  Would another monetary policy regime (e.g. 
exchange rate targeting or a strict price level targeting) imply a more or less stable 
macroeconomic environment? What type of monetary policy did countries with floating 
exchange rates choose; output stability, price stability or some type of intermediate 
target? Did countries like Canada and New Zealand put more weight on price stability 
after adopting an explicit inflation target? 
In recent years, a growing literature has considered New Keynesian open-
economy models of monetary policy (e.g. Ball (1999), Svensson (2000), Batini and 
Haldane (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), (2001)). However, most of these 
papers consider monetary policy under a floating exchange rate regime, and only a few 
compare exchange rate targeting with inflation targeting. A recent exception is Gali and 
Monacelli (2002), who present a small open economy model version of a model with 
staggered price-setting, and use this as a framework to study the properties of three 
alternative regimes: an optimal monetary policy, a Taylor rule and exchange rate 
targeting.  
In this paper, I will analyze the stabilizing properties of alternative monetary 
policy regimes using a small, estimated open-economy model with forward-looking 
aggregate demand and supply, and with stylized realistic lags in the different    2
Table 1: Description of the countries 
Country  Floating exchange 
rate since 
     
Australia  1984       
Canada  1970       
Japan  1974       
New Zealand  1985       
Sweden  1993       
Switzerland  1974       
United Kingdom  1993       
 
transmission channels for monetary policy. In practice, there is a choice between two 
broad types of monetary policy regimes: a fixed exchange rate regime and a floating 
exchange rate regime. This paper studies how output, prices and exchange rates would 
have evolved for seven countries (the countries I will consider are reported in Table 1) 
with a pure floating exchange rate regime, if the central bank had had a different target.
1 
I will consider four alternative targets for the central bank: (1) exchange rate peg, (2) 
strict price level targeting, (3) flexible price level targeting and (4) output gap targeting. 
In contrast to most of the existing literature – which compares stability properties under 
different hypothetical monetary policy regimes – these counterfactual experiments allow 
us also to evaluate the actual monetary policy regime and not just to compare stability 
properties under different hypothetical monetary policy regimes.
2  
The results indicate that flexible price level targeting, or strict price level 
targeting, gives the most stable macroeconomic environment in terms of price, output 
and exchange rate variability. An output gap target regime gives a more volatile price 
level but also a more volatile nominal exchange rate, because there is a strong monetary 
policy response to different shocks. The results also indicate that a strict exchange rate 
target would have implied a more volatile output and higher price volatility for most 
____________ 
1For a detailed survey of the monetary policy and macroeconomic development for these countries (all 
except Japan) during their period of a floating exchange rate regime, see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and 
Posen (1999).
  
2Similar types of counterfactual experiments in the case of a closed economy are discussed in Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1999) and Söderlind (2001).   3
countries. Somewhat surprisingly, a fixed exchange rate does not provide a more stable 
real exchange rate than a floating exchange rate regime. The reason is that a central 
bank that targets the nominal exchange rate responds less vigorously to domestic 
disturbances than it does under a floating exchange rate regime. The actual monetary 
policy seems to be best characterized as flexible price level targeting, but there seem to 
be quite substantial differences in the choice of monetary policy regimes between 
different countries. For example, Japan and Canada seem to put much less weight on 
stabilizing the price level than Sweden. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, I will present a theoretical 
open-economy model.  The empirical analysis begins in section 3, where I describe the 
data and estimate the model. In section 4, I describe the alternative monetary policy 
regimes and their performance is evaluated in section 5 by considering the effect of 
various regimes on the stability of output, prices, the real exchange rate and the nominal 
exchange rate. In section 6, I consider how the performance of the regimes may change 
with a more active fiscal policy and when monetary policy becomes more effective in 
affecting output. Finally, section 7 provides the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
I consider a small open economy model, similar to those of Batini and Haldane (1999) 
and Svensson (2000). The model is quarterly and all variables (except the interest rate) 
are measured in logs as deviations from the steady state. Aggregate demand for 
domestically produced goods in period t is given by: 
 
t s t s t s t t s t t r r y q y h g t b
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- - + - - .                                                                       (1) 
 
Here, for any variable  x,  s t t x - |  denotes the rational expectation of  t x , conditional on all 
information available at time t-s.
3  t r  is the short real interest rate and  r  the natural 
________ 
3Equation (1) is derived with some micro foundations in appendix A  
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(long-run mean) short interest rate. Thus, the aggregate demand depends on the sum of 
current and expected future deviations of the real interest rate from its mean. There is a 
decision/planning horizon of s periods, so that the interest rate affects the economy with 
a lag of s periods. The variable  t q  is the real exchange rate, defined as 
 
t t t t p p e q - + =
* ,                                                                                                             (2) 
  
where  t e  is the exchange rate, 
*
t p  the foreign price level and  t p  the domestic CPI price 
level. The real exchange rate affects the economy with a lag of s periods, because the 
market shares in the international market adjust slowly to changes in relative prices (see 
e.g. Gottfries (2002)).  b ˆ  is a measure of how sensitive real output is to changes in the 
real exchange rate. 
Parameter t captures the effect of fiscal policy stabilization. If fiscal policy were 
fully flexible, one could minimize a loss function and find the optimal fiscal policy rule. 
However, such flexibility in fiscal policy seems unrealistic, given fiscal policy decision 
lags, political negotiations etc. (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995), Ohlsson and Vredin 
(1996)). I therefore adopt the following reaction function for government expenditure: 
 
g
t s t t t y g h t ˆ ˆ | + = - ,                                                                                                               (3)      
           
where  t g is  government expenditure (measured as deviations from the steady state), and 
g
t h ˆ is a vector of other variables influencing fiscal policy (e.g. elections and government 
ideology) that are assumed to be independent of the monetary policy regime. Parameter 
tˆis a measure of how sensitive government expenditure is to changes in the output gap. 
Fiscal policy is assumed to be the same under different monetary policy regimes. 
Equation (3) may be considered as an active fiscal policy, where fiscal policy responds 
to the level of activity (represented by the output gap). Alternatively, equation (3) may 
be considered as a representation of a passive fiscal policy with automatic stabilization, 
where  tˆis the degree of  automatic stabilization.  t  in equation (1) is equal to  tˆ 2 n , 
where  2 n is the share of public demand in total aggregate demand.    5
The term  t h ˆ  is a vector of exogenous variables, for example, changes in foreign output, 
fiscal policy and domestic preference shocks that are independent of the domestic 
monetary policy regime. Thus,  t h ˆ captures everything affecting the output gap, except 
influences from monetary policy and fiscal policy stabilization. 
I assume that the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) holds, which implies 
that the real interest parity condition  
 
t t t t t q q r r - = - +
*
| 1                                                                                                             (4)       
                                                                      
holds, where 
*
t r is the foreign short real interest rate and  t t t q q - + | 1  the expected relative 
change in the real exchange rate. Note that  t q  and the sum of the current and expected 
future deviations of the real interest rate are closely related. By equation (4), we have  
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Hence, the only reason for the domestic sum of the current and expected future real 
interest rates to deviate from the foreign sum of the current and expected future real 
interest rates is that the real exchange rate deviates from the equilibrium level. 
Substituting in the new expression for the interest term (equation (5)) into the output 
equation, we get: 
  
t s t t s t s t s t t y p p e y h t b + + - + = - -
*
- - | ) ( ,                                                                             (6) 
 
where  ) ( ˆ
0






t g h h  and  g b b + = ˆ . Parameter b  is a measure of how 
sensitive real output is to changes in the real exchange rate. Thus, the output gap 
consists of three parts: the real exchange rate  q , government fiscal policy and the 
exogenous variable  t h , that is assumed to be independent of the monetary policy regime 
(due to the assumption of a “small open” economy, the foreign interest rate can be   6
treated as exogenous to the domestic economy). t h  is assumed to follow a stationary 
autoregressive process 
 
t t t t J h r h r h + + = - - 2 2 1 1 ,                                                                                                  (7) 
 
where  t J  is white noise. This specification of the exogenous variables is chosen for 
simplicity; obviously we would get the same results if the different exogenous variables 
were explicitly introduced. t h  is derived and discussed in further detail in appendix A. 
Wages are set according to a standard wage equation (e.g. Blanchard and Katz 
(1999)), where the wage setters in sector j set the wage according to the following 
equation:  
 
k t s t k t t k t t jt y b w d dp w - + - - + - + = | | | ˆ ) 1 ( .                                                                                 (8)    
  
Here, for any variable  x,  k t t x - |  denotes the wage setter’s rational expectation  of  t x , 
conditional on the information available when the wage ( t w ) is set.  t p  denotes the CPI 
price level and  t w  the aggregate wage level. Wages in period t also depend on  the 
expected output gap, thereby capturing tightness in the labor market. Wages in period t 
depend on the expected output gap in period t+s, since wages affect output with a lag of 
s periods, i.e. the wage level in period t affects output (unemployment) in period t+s. 
Hence, wage setters have a tradeoff between high wages in period t and low output 
(unemployment) in period t+s. All wage setters have the same information, so that 
aggregating over all wage setters implies that they set the wage ( t w ) such that: 
 
t k t s t k t t t by p w e + + = - + - | | ,                                                                                                  (9)    
 
where  d b b / ˆ =  and a zero-mean supply shock (cost-push shock),  t e , has been added. 
Assuming monopolistic competition in the domestic economy, domestic prices are set as 
a mark-up on wages (i.e.  t
d
t W P =  where 
d
t P is the price of domestically produced 
goods). Then we get that the CPI price level is given by a weighted average the prices of 
imported goods and the wage level:   7
) )( 1 ( t t t t e p w p + - + =
* a a ,                                                                                       (10) 
 
where a is the elasticity of the CPI price level with respect to the domestic wage level
4. 
That is, I assume that there is no lag in the pass-through of imported costs to domestic 
prices of imported goods. Substituting the wage equation into the CPI equation, the 
aggregated supply equation (Phillips curve) can be expressed in terms of CPI inflation:  
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where the CPI inflation is defined as  1 - - = t t t p p p .
5 Thus, the CPI inflation depends on 
the expected CPI inflation, the future output gap, the real exchange rate ( t q ) and the
 
cost-push shock ( t e ). According to equation (11), higher expected inflation, increased 
aggregated demand or a real exchange rate depreciation will imply higher inflation.  
In this model, monetary policy affects the economy through several transmission 
channels. First, there is a conventional real interest rate channel, working through the 
output gap and then onto wages and prices. Second, a change in the interest rate also 
affects the exchange rate, which influences aggregate demand through the price of 
domestic goods in terms of foreign goods, thereby affecting wages and prices. A change 
in the exchange rate also has a direct effect on CPI inflation through the prices of 
imported goods and this is the fastest and most direct channel through which monetary 








4The share of imported goods (1-a ) in the CPI is exactly constant if the utility function over domestic 
and imported goods has a constant elasticity of substitution equal to unity (Cobb-Douglas utility 
function), as assumed in appendix A. 
5 ) ( ˆ | 1 1 k t t t t t p p - - - - - =e e .   8
3. Estimation 
 
In this section, I proceed by estimating the CPI price equation (10), the wage equation 
(9), the government demand equation (3) and the output equation (6) to get values of 
a, t , b  and  b . Before making these estimations, I need to assign the length of the wage 
setters’ wage contract (k) and the consumers’ decision lag (s). Wage contracts are 
typically valid for 1 to 3 years. In the baseline case, I assume that wage setters set the 
wage one year ahead and that the consumers’ decision lag is two quarters, i.e. k = 4 and  
s = 2. Thus, wage setters can affect the price level with a four-quarter lag and output 
with a six-quarter lag. All variables in the estimated equations are treated as stationary 
variables, because before estimating equations (3),(6), (9) and (10), they are detrended 
with an HP-filter. 
Quarterly data on the effective exchange rate (e), real GDP (y), domestic CPI 
prices (p), foreign CPI prices (p*), wages (hourly rates in manufacturing) and 
government expenditure (g) are collected from the OECD database Main Economic 
Indicators. For each country, the exchange rate index is constructed as a competition 
weighted sum of exchange rate series for ten OECD countries.
6 The foreign price index 
is constructed using the same methodology and trade weights as in the exchange rate 
index. All variables are log transformed and detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
with a standard smoothing coefficient of 1600. Appendix B provides more details on 
data sources and definitions for all variables. 
 The CPI price equation is estimated individually by an ordinary least square for 
each country to get a measure of the elasticity of the CPI price level, with respect to the 
domestic wage level (the value of a ).  Table 2 shows the estimated parameter values. 
As expected, small countries such as Canada, Sweden and Switzerland have a smaller 
a  value than larger countries such as Japan, because the domestically produced share of 
GDP is much smaller for these countries. Australia and New Zealand have quite a high 
a  value compared to the “European “ countries, since the share of their GDP that 
consists of imports is quite small (around 20 percent).
7 
____________ 
6For a survey of different definitions of the exchange rate index, see e.g. Lafrance, Osakwe and St-Amant 
(1998) and Nilsson (1999).
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Table 2: Model estimates (t-values in parentheses) 
Country  a   b  b                 t ˆ  
Australia 
) 59 . 40 (
92 . 0  
) 97 . 0 (
07 . 0 -  
) 98 . 2 (
11 . 0  
) 28 . 2 (
42 . 0 -  
Canada 
) 39 . 34 (
83 . 0  
) 83 . 2 (
32 . 0  
) 32 . 3 (
46 . 0  
) 05 . 3 (
78 . 0 -  
Japan 
) 99 . 49 (
96 . 0  
) 66 . 3 (
70 . 0  
) 66 . 2 (
22 . 0  
) 91 . 2 (
81 . 0 -  
New Zealand 
) 42 . 33 (
95 . 0  
) 09 . 2 (
41 . 0  
) 44 . 1 (
16 . 0  
) 60 . 0 (
16 . 0 -  
Sweden 
) 71 . 20 (
82 . 0  
) 95 . 2 (
38 . 0  
) 21 . 3 (
37 . 0  
) 96 . 2 (
35 . 0 -  
Switzerland 
) 96 . 22 (
72 . 0  
) 61 . 2 (
37 . 0  
) 11 . 1 (
50 . 0  
) 92 . 2 (
54 . 0 -  
United Kingdom 
) 53 . 34 (
97 . 0  
) 49 . 5 (
60 . 0  
) 26 . 2 (
15 . 0  
) 44 . 2 (
40 . 0 -  
Note: The CPI price equation (equation (10)) is estimated with OLS to get a measure of  a , the wage 
equation is estimated with GMM to get a measure of b and the output equation (equation (6)) and the 
government reaction function (equation (3)) are estimated as a system using GMM to get a value of 
t ˆ andb . 
 
The econometric procedure for estimating the wage equation is relatively 
straightforward
 (see e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) for a more detailed description 
of this procedure). Let  k t- W  denote a vector of variables observed at time t-k. Then, 
under rational expectations, equation (9) defines the set of orthogonality conditions 
 
. 0 ] | [ = W - - - + k t s t t t by p w E                                                                                           (12) 
 
Given these conditions, we can estimate the model using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM). In this case, the GMM estimator can be seen as a generalization of 
2SLS/3SLS that takes account of moving average errors and heteroscedasticity, 
conditional on the instruments. For each country, the vector of instruments,  k t- W , 
includes lagged values of output, domestic and foreign prices, exchange rates and 
wages. Table 2 shows the estimated parameter values. Overall, the
 empirical model 
works reasonably well in most cases. The slope coefficients on the output gap are 
positive, as implied by the theory for all countries except Australia.  
 
___________________________ 
7The share of imports of GDP: Australia 0.21, Canada 0.38, Japan 0.08, New Zealand 0.23, Sweden 0.35, 
Switzerland 0.35 and the United Kingdom 0.29. 
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The output equation (equation (6)) and the government reaction function (equation (3)) 
are estimated as a system using generalized method of moments (GMM) to get a 
measure of how sensitive government expenditure is to changes in the output gap (the 
value of  t ˆ ) and how sensitive real output is to changes in the real exchange rate (the 
value of  b ). Equations (3) and (6) are estimated as a system because the parameter t ˆ  
enters both equations.  As discussed in section 2, the system will contain autoregressive 
(AR (2)) error specifications.  I use instruments of output, domestic and foreign prices, 
exchange rates and wages, dated t-s or earlier. For each country,  2 n  is calculated as the 
average share of public demand in total aggregate demand. According to table 2, the 
empirical model works reasonably well for all countries. Government expenditure is 
negatively correlated with aggregated demand and a real deprecation stimulates 
aggregate demand. The t-values suggest some imprecision in the point estimate of  b , 
but coefficients are within the realm of reason and, as expected, small countries such as 
Canada, Sweden and Switzerland have a higher  b  value than larger countries such as 
Japan and the United Kingdom.  
Using the detrended time series for domestic real GDP, the domestic CPI price 
level, the foreign price level and the exchange rate index, I calculate the actual path for 
h  using equation (6) as: 
 
s t t s t s t s t t t y p p e y - -
*
- - - - + - = | ) ( t b h .                                                                            (13) 
 
Thus, h  is defined as the output gap purged from the effects of variations in the real 
exchange rate and fiscal policy stabilization. This implies that h  captures everything 
affecting the output gap, except influences from monetary policy and systematic fiscal 
policy. The supply shock (cost-push shock) is analogously calculated as the residual 
from the wage equation: 
 
) ( | | k t s t k t t t t by p w - + - + - = e .                                                                                             (14) 
 
Alternatively, I could have proceeded by assigning some values of the structural shocks 
(assigning variances in the disturbance terms in equations (6) and (9)). However, one 
advantage of using the residuals from the regression equation as a measure of structural   11
shocks is that we can make counterfactual experiments and not just compare stability 
properties under different hypothetical regimes. Thus, this paper studies how the 
economies in Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK 
would have performed if they had been subject to structural disturbances (h and  e ), 
whose properties are the same as those affecting them in the past while, at the same 
time, the monetary policy conducted by the central bank had been different. 
Table 3 reports the standard deviations of the output gap, the real exchange rate, 
the exogenous variable h  and the supply shock (e ). Comparing the volatility of the 
output gap and the exogenous variable h, we note that the volatility of the output gap is 
smaller than that of  h for all counties. Hence, the real exchange rate and the 
government’s fiscal policy have had a stabilizing effect on the economy. Comparing the 
stability properties between different countries indicates that the volatility of the output 
gap seems to be quite similar across countries, ranging between 1.44 and 2.18, but there 
are quite substantial differences in the volatility of the real exchange rate. 
 
Table 3: Volatility measures. Standard deviations in percent. 
Country  y   h  e   q  Sample 
Australia  1.44  1.73  1.58  6.34  1984:1-2000:2 
Canada  1.51  1.81  1.43  3.33  1970:1-2000:2 
Japan  1.52  3.85  2.13  8.57  1974:1-2000:2 
New Zealand  2.18  2.52  2.09  6.39  1985:1-2000:2 
Sweden  1.82  2.38  2.24  4.44  1993:1-2000:2 
Switzerland  1.77  3.02  1.50  4.09  1974:1-2000:2 
United Kingdom  1.63  3.83  1.94  5.53  1993:1-2000:2 
 
 
4. Monetary policy regimes 
 
The short nominal interest rate (i) is the instrument of the central bank. When the 
central bank sets the interest rate, it directly affects the exchange rate, due to the interest 
parity condition. Therefore, we can treat the exchange rate as the control variable of the 
central bank. I assume that the central bank sets  t i  to minimize the following 
intertemporal loss function: 







d ,                                                                                                                     (15) 
 
where  d is the discount factor and  t L (the period t loss) is a function of the target 
variables.
8 The central bank minimizes the loss function, given its information in period 
t-m, where the size of m depends on the central bank’s information/implementation lag. 
I set the information lag to two quarters, i.e. m = 2. This implies that the central bank 
can affect output with a one-year lag, and the CPI price level with a two-quarter lag. 
Usually, its main goal is to maintain price stability and without prejudice, this goal the 
central bank should try to support the general economic policy to reach goals such as 
high sustainable growth and full employment. For this purpose, the central bank usually 
has targets (operational goals) such as an inflation/price level target, a zero output gap 
target or a fixed exchange rate target. To describe the behavior of the central bank, I 
consider the following loss function: 
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where 
n p is the CPI price level target and 
* e is the nominal exchange rate target (e.g. a 
basket of foreign exchange rates).
9 In practice, there is a choice between two broad 
types of monetary policy regimes: a fixed or a floating exchange rate regime. In the first 
case, there is a continuum of variants, ranging from a strict exchange rate target 
(adopting the currency of another country or groups of countries) to more flexible 
variants of exchange rate targeting. In the second case of monetary policy regimes, there 
is also a continuum of variants, ranging from a strict price level target/strict inflation 
target to a strict output gap target.
 
In this paper, I consider one fixed and three floating exchange rate regimes. I 
evaluate the performance under a strict exchange rate target regime, where the domestic 
currency is fixed in terms of a competition-weighted basket of currencies.
10 I also  
__________ 
8 I set the discount factor d equal to 0.99 
9Since the central bank’s output target is equal to natural output, there will be no average price level bias. 
Hence, the average price level will coincide with the price level target.  
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evaluate the performance under the following three floating exchange rate regimes: 
strict price level targeting (inflation nutter), strict output gap targeting and flexible price 
level targeting (intermediate targeting). More precisely, I consider the following four 
regimes: 
 
•  Strict exchange rate targeting: , 0 = y l   , 0 = p l   1 = e l  
•  Output gap targeting:  , 1 = y l   , 0 = p l   0 = e l  
•  Flexible price level targeting:  , 1 = y l   , 1 = p l   0 = e l  
•  Strict price level targeting:  , 0 = y l   , 1 = p l   0 = e l  
 
Under the floating exchange rate regimes, the central bank sets the interest rate so as to 
reach price or output stability (a combination of these two under the intermediate 
target). Substituting equations for output, CPI prices and the wage equation into the loss 
function and solving the central bank’s problem, we get the following optimal reaction 
function (under a floating exchange rate regime) for the nominal exchange rate:  
 
 
t s t s t k t s t m t s t m t t
n
t t a a a a p p e e h h h 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | - - - - - = - + - + - +
*
- ,                                                  (17) 
 
where  3 2 1 , , a a a  and  4 a are complicated functions of  t b a l l , , , , , b p y  and  d .
11 A 
formal treatment of the optimization procedure is given in appendix C. According to 
equation (17), it is optimal to respond to the expected determinants of the targets, rather 
than the targets themselves.
12 The coefficients in the reaction function (the numerical 
values of  3 2 1 , , a a a  and  4 a ) are summarized for the three different regimes in appendix 
D.  First, the central bank responds directly to the price level target (
n p ) and the 
____________________ 
10The fixed exchange rate regime should not be interpreted as joining a monetary union, since a monetary 
union is likely to have other more fundamental effects than those reflected in my analysis. It can be 
argued that the main reasons for joining a monetary union are of microeconomic origin, i.e. the reduction 
of trade barriers. These changes would most likely affect the economic structure and hence, the shocks. 
 
11 The optimal reaction function can also be written in terms of the short nominal interest rate: 
1 4 | 1 3 | 1 2 | 1 1 | 1 1 + - + + - + + - + +
*
+ +
* D - D - D - D - - + = t s t s t k t s t m t s t t t
n
t t t a a a a i i e h h h p p , 
where 
n p is the domestic CPI inflation target, 
* p  foreign inflation and  * i the foreign nominal interest 
rate.
  
12This is usually the case under targeting rules (see e.g. Svensson (1999)). 
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expected foreign price level (
* p ), because in the long run, this will imply that the real 
exchange rate is stable and that the foreign price level measured in domestic currency is 
equal to the price level target.  Second, it responds to the expected demand shocks 
( m t s t - + | h ), in such a way that the exchange rate is expected to neutralize those shocks. 
The reaction function coefficient for the expected demand shocks ( 1 a ) is, as expected, 
smallest in  the case of a strict price level target regime and largest in the case of an 
output target regime (see appendix D). Third, the central bank also takes into account 
wage setters’ and government expectations of demand shocks, because the wage level 
will have a direct effect on the CPI price level and an indirect effect on the output level 
through the real exchange rate channel and the government’s fiscal policy will have a 
direct effect on output. Under a strict price level target regime, the central bank reacts to 
the wage setter’s expectations of the demand shocks and not to his own expectations of 
the demand shock, because the wage setter’s expectations of the demand shock will 
directly affect the CPI-price level (see equation (9)). Fourth, the central bank’s reaction 
to supply shocks ( t e ) depends on the target, since there is a trade off between price and 
output stability. For example, consider a positive supply shock. In this case, there is a 
tradeoff between price and output stability, because if the central bank tries to stabilize 
the price level by appreciating the exchange rate this will, at the same time, imply a 
negative effect on output. These conclusions are also confirmed by appendix D, because 
4 a is largest (i.e. stabilizes the price level from the supply shock) in the case of a strict 
price level target and negative in the case of an output gap target regime (i.e. a positive 
supply shock implies an increased price level; thus to keep the real exchange rate 
constant, the central bank must devaluate the currency). 
Alternatively, the reaction function can be expressed as a function of expected 
output, prices and the real exchange rate
 
 
s t t k t t m t t s t s t k t s t m t s t m t t
n
t t q b q b q b y b y b y b p p e - - - - + - + - +
*
- + + + + + + - = | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |                                                      
       
       ) ( ) ( | | 7 | | 6 s t t m t t k t t m t t p p b p p b - - - - - + - ,                                                                        (18) 
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where  6 5 4 3 2 1 , , , , , b b b b b b  and  7 b are also complicated functions of  t b a l l , , , , , b p y  and 
d . According to (18), the central bank responds to its own expectations of the output 
gap, prices and the real exchange rate, but it also takes into account the wage setters’ 
and the public sector’s expectations of these variables. 
In the case of strict exchange rate targeting, the reaction function is simplified to 
 
* = t t e e ,                                                                                                                          (19) 
  
for in this case, the only task for the central bank is to keep the exchange rate fixed. The 
hypothetical paths for output, real exchange rate and prices under the different regimes 
are calculated by plugging the reaction function of the exchange rate into these 
equations. This implies that the new expressions for output, CPI prices etc. will be 
functions of variables that all are exogenous to the monetary policy regime. For 
example, as shown in appendix C, the output gap is a function of 
t k t t s t t m t t t m t t t
n
t p p y e h h h h , , , , , , , | | | | - - -
*
-
*  and parameters  t b a l l , , , , , b p y  and  d  under a 
floating exchange rate regime.  Using the actual path for h and  e , the central bank’s, 
the wage setter’s and the government’s forecasts for  h and the parameters defined in 
Table 2, we have all the information necessary to calculate new hypothetical paths for 




5. Macroeconomic stability of alternative monetary policy regimes 
 
It has become quite customary to consider welfare implications by the use of a loss 
function, where only inflation and output enter as arguments. There are, however, 
disadvantages with that approach, because other variables might enter the true welfare 
function. For example, it may be argued that, in small open economies, real and nominal 
exchange rate variability has a direct effect on welfare, due to the role of the exchange 
___________________ 
13The central bank, the government and wage setters form their expectations of h  and 
* p according to 
the following forecast functions (see e.g. Enders (1995)):  1
2 1
| - - - - + = f f f t t t t x a x a x , for  xequal to h  or 
* p .    
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rate in international trade and financial stability. Therefore, any measure of the 
performance of the alternative monetary policy regimes in terms of a single welfare 
criterion would be quite arbitrary. For this reason, I have chosen to compare the regimes 
separately in terms of the variability of each variable. Standard deviations in output, 
prices, the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate under the alternative 
regimes are summarized in Table 4 and in Figure 1.
  
I first discuss the general tradeoffs facing the central bank in a floating exchange 
rate regime and then, I examine the actual exchange rate regime. For most countries, this 
can  be described as an intermediate regime between inflation targeting and output 
targeting. Then, I consider a fixed exchange rate regime, comparing it both to 
hypothetical floating and the actual regime. In general, exchange rate targeting leads to 
increased output and price volatility. 
 
 5.1 Tradeoffs under a floating exchange rate regime 
What tradeoffs does the central bank face under a floating exchange rate? According to 
Table 4 and the efficiency frontier in Figure 1, a strict price level target implies much 
lower price volatility but only somewhat higher output volatility as compared to the 
intermediate and the output gap target regimes for all countries. For all countries, the 
real exchange rate is more stable under strict price level targeting than under 
intermediate and output gap targeting. In most cases, the nominal exchange rate is more 
stable under strict price level targeting than under the other regimes.  
The real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate are more stable under a 
strict price level target, than under the other regimes since the central bank does not 
respond to all shocks and its response to different shocks is moderate (see appendix D 
for the reaction-function coefficients under the different regimes). The central bank only 
responds to supply shocks and the wage setter’s expectations of the demand shock, 
because the direct effect of the demand shock will not affect the price level, only the 
wage setter’s expectations of the demand shock will affect the price level. The central 
bank’s response to supply shocks is more moderate under a strict price level target than 
under an output gap target regime, because the real exchange rate channel will help 
neutralize the supply shocks under a price level target regime. For example, a supply 
   17
Table 4: Stabilization properties. Standard deviations in percent. 








             
CPI  5.10  2.29  2.99  3.64  6.29  2.44  1.50 
Output   2.13  1.57  1.48  2.68  1.89  1.65  2.21 
Real exchange rate  6.17  1.86  15.05  4.46  6.02  2.98  5.43 
Exchange rate  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Strict price level 
targeting 
             
CPI  0.27  0.16  0.12  0.55  0.34  0.16  0.20 
Output   1.57  1.55  1.60  3.01  1.84  1.92  1.97 
Real exchange rate  5.51  1.44  7.89  4.28  4.94  2.57  3.35 
Exchange rate  5.07  2.71  5.25  3.61  5.14  3.24  1.56 
Flexible price 
level targeting 
             
CPI  1.59  0.70  0.30  1.78  2.93  1.04  0.43 
Output   1.19  1.48  1.46  2.23  1.42  1.37  1.66 
Real exchange rate  6.49  1.54  8.16  5.54  4.96  3.00  3.44 
Exchange rate  6.09  3.38  5.10  5.87  2.97  2.77  1.76 
Output gap 
targeting 
             
CPI  12.81  6.34  2.44  5.53  12.57  9.65  3.27 
Output   1.10  1.41  1.31  1.65  1.28  1.21  1.44 
Real exchange rate  7.26  1.96  9.44  5.61  5.24  4.19  4.25 
Exchange rate  15.36  7.61  8.01  9.12  7.89  13.08  4.59 
Actual               
CPI  1.37  1.41  2.14  2.18  1.32  1.52  0.60 
Output   1.44  1.51  1.52  2.38  1.82  1.77  1.63 
Real exchange rate  6.34  3.33  8.57  6.39  4.44  4.09  5.53 
Exchange rate  6.91  3.22  8.55  5.56  4.43  3.96  5.21   18
shock that increases the price level automatically l eads to a real exchange rate 
appreciation (for a constant nominal exchange rate). According to equation (11), a real 
exchange rate appreciation will dampen the effects of a supply shock. Thus, under a 
strict price level target, we only have to appreciate the nominal exchange rate somewhat 
to reach price stability.  
An output gap target implies a more stable output pattern, but at the cost of 
substantially higher price and real and nominal exchange rate volatility, compared to the 
intermediate and strict price level target regimes for all countries. Thus, there seems to 
be quite high a “price” to pay in terms of higher price and exchange rate volatility to 
reach a more stable output pattern. Real and nominal exchange rates are more volatile 
under an output gap target regime, because there is a strong monetary policy response to 
different shocks (see appendix D). The central bank tries to set the exchange rate such 
that the covariance between the real exchange rate and the demand shock is equal to 
minus one. Comparing the stability properties of the three different floating exchange 
rate regimes in Table 4 and the efficiency frontiers in Figure 1, we see that flexible price 
level targeting, or perhaps strict price level targeting, creates the most stable 
macroeconomic environment. 
 
5.2 The actual monetary policy 
Comparing the standard deviation for output and the CPI in Table 4 and Figure 1, we 
can see that the actual monetary policy, for all countries, seems to be somewhere in 
between the strict price level target regime and the output gap target regime. Hence, the 
actual policy seems to best be characterized as an intermediate or a flexible price 
targeting. But there seem to be quite substantial differences in the choice of monetary 
policy regimes between different countries. For example, Japan and Canada seem to put 
much less weight on stabilizing the price level than Sweden. These conclusions are also 
confirmed by calculating the value of  p l , such that the standard deviation of the actual 
CPI is equal to the standard deviation of the hypothetical CPI (in the case when  1 = y l  
and  0 = e l ).  According to Table 5, flexible price level targeting can characterize the 
monetary policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom and output gap targeting can almost characterize the monetary policy 
in Japan.   19
Table 5: The ”actual “ value of  p l  
Country 
p l  
Australia  1.37 
Canada  0.71 
Japan  0.17 
New Zealand  0.89 
Sweden  2.02 
Switzerland  0.79 
United Kingdom  0.93 
 
5.3 A fixed exchange rate regime  
A strict exchange rate target would have implied a more volatile price level pattern for 
all countries, compared to strict price level targeting and flexible price level targeting. If 
we instead compare the fixed exchange rate regime with output gap targeting, we can 
see that exchange rate targeting would have implied a more stable price level pattern 
than under output gap targeting. Thus, in most cases, exchange rate targeting would 
have implied a more volatile price level pattern. Observe that comparing the stability of 
the price level and not inflation stability, implies a fairer comparison between the 
different regimes because exchange rate targeting may be considered as an implicit 
long-run price level target, where the domestic price level must have a constant relation 
to the foreign price level over time in order to achieve consistency between the 
equilibrium real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate target.  
Comparing output volatility under fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, we 
see that a fixed regime would have implied a more volatile output pattern in most cases. 
More exactly, output is more volatile under the fixed regime than under output gap 
targeting and flexible price level targeting, and about the same as under strict price level 
targeting. Australia, Canada, Sweden and the UK have somewhat lower output volatility 
under a strict price level target regime and Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland have 
somewhat higher output volatility under a strict price level target regime compared with 
the fixed exchange rate regime. There is no clear pattern for the real exchange rate; three 
countries out of seven have a m ore stable real exchange rate pattern under the fixed 
regime than under flexible price level targeting. Thus, exchange rate targeting has the   20
same type of properties as output targeting: Low volatility in one variable (nominal 
exchange rate or output) implies higher volatility in other variables.  
We can also compare the actual monetary policy regime to a hypothetical fixed 
exchange rate regime. A strict exchange rate target would have implied a more volatile 
price and output for most countries compared to  the actual regime, except for 
Switzerland and Japan where the actual output is somewhat more volatile than under 
exchange rate targeting. Somewhat surprisingly, a fixed exchange rate regime does not 
provide a more stable real exchange rate for all countries.  The reason for this is that a 
central bank targeting the nominal exchange rate responds less vigorously to domestic 
disturbances than it does under a floating exchange rate regime (the domestic interest 
rate must follow the foreign interest rate). For  example, increased domestic prices 
(increased wages), due e.g., to a positive cost-push shock lead to a real exchange rate 
appreciation, since the nominal exchange rate is constant. Eventually, the dampening 
effect of the real appreciation more than offsets the initial effect of the cost-push shock, 
and inflation will start to decrease.  Lower inflation implies a real exchange rate 
depreciation, so the cycle will turn again. Although a shock will generate such 
oscillations in the key variables, the estimated coefficients in the model ensure stability, 
so that the oscillations diminish. Thus, a strict exchange rate target would have implied 
a more stable real exchange rate for most countries, but at the cost of higher output 
volatility and higher price volatility for most countries.  
 
5.4 Monetary policy before and after an explicit inflation target 
In the last years, several countries such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada have 
shifted to a new monetary policy regime characterized by an explicit inflation  target. 
Calculating the value of  p l , such that the standard deviation of the actual CPI is equal 
to the standard deviation of the hypothetical CPI (in the case when  1 = y l  and  0 = e l ) 
before and after they shifted to an inflation target regime, we get an indicator of whether 
these countries put more weight on price stability after adopting an explicit inflation 
target. According to Table 6, Australia and Canada do so and New Zealand puts about 
the same  weight on price stability after shifting to an inflation target.
14 Hence, the 
central bank seems to put more weight on price/inflation stability also in practice after 
shifting to a new monetary policy regime characterized by an explicit inflation target.   21
Table 6: The value of  p l  before and after an explicit inflation target 
Country   
p l  
Period   
p l  
Period 
Australia  1.37  1985:1-2000:2  2.49  1993:1-2000:2 
Canada  0.71  1971:1-2000:2  1.09  1991:1-2000:2 
New Zealand  0.89  1986:1-2000:2  0.82  1990:1-2000:2 
 
 
6. Sensitivity analysis  
 
6.1 Fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability  
The political and academic support for an activist fiscal policy has declined 
considerably in the last few decades. Experience shows that using fiscal policy to 
manage aggregate demand tends to lead to excessive government debt, which limits the 
room for manoeuvre in fiscal policy over time.  However, an active fiscal policy 
responding to the level of activity is particularly beneficial when monetary policy is 
oriented toward exchange rate targeting, or strict price level targeting. It may therefore 
be argued that comparisons between these regimes and flexible price level targeting do 
not do justice to exchange rate or strict price level targeting, if the degree of fiscal policy 
stabilization is assumed to be the same. Hence, t ˆ might be higher under strict price level 
targeting or exchange rate targeting than under a flexible price level-targeting regime. 
Moreover, by considering strict price level targeting and a more active fiscal policy, we 
can analyze whether fiscal policy is a substitute for monetary policy with respect to the 
stabilization of aggregate demand, so that the central bank can focus solely on 
controlling the price level.   
Table 7 shows the effects of a more active fiscal policy on the standard deviations 
of the variables in the model. I consider the case where  2 ˆ - = t (i.e. a high degree of 
fiscal policy stabilization) for all countries instead of the estimated value reported in 
Table 2. According to Table 7, a more counter-cycle fiscal policy reduces the variability 
__________________ 
14Australia: the period with an inflation target reduces CPI and output volatility. Canada: the period with 
an inflation target reduces CPI and increases output volatility. New Zealand: the period with an inflation 
target reduces CPI and output volatility.   22
Table 7:  An active fiscal policy ( 2 ˆ - = t ). Standard deviations in percent. 
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Note: Stabilization properties under modest fiscal policy stabilization given in parentheses (i.e. the same 
as reported in Table 4). 
 
of output considerably both under a strict price level targeting and an exchange rate 
targeting regime. More precisely, strict price level targeting or exchange rate targeting 
with a high degree of fiscal policy stabilization generates about the same output 
variability as a flexible price level targeting regime with a more modest degree of fiscal 
stabilization. This suggests that a more active fiscal policy responding to the output gap 
produces a considerable improvement in the price-output variability tradeoff. Turing this 
result around, this suggests that a more active fiscal policy makes it possible for the 
central bank to focus more on price stability under a floating exchange rate regime, 
without sacrificing stability in the real economy. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that a more active fiscal policy also reduces 
the variability of the nominal and the real exchange rate with strict price level targeting 
and the variability of the real exchange rate and prices with exchange rate targeting. The   23
reason for that lies in the effect that wage setters respond to the level of activity in the 
economy (equation (9)), i.e. a more stable aggregate demand will also imply a more 
stable wage level and hence, a more stable price level.  
 
6.2 How sensitive is output to changes in the real exchange rate? 
In section 3, the output equation and the government reaction function were estimated as 
a system using a generalized method of moments to get a measure of how sensitive 
government expenditure is to changes in the output gap (the value of  t ˆ ) and how 
sensitive real output is to changes in the real exchange rate (the value of  b ). The point 
estimates of  b  (see table 2) seem to be within the realm of reason and, as expected, 
small countries such as Canada, Sweden and Switzerland have a higher  b  value than 
larger countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom, but the t-values suggest some 
imprecision in the point estimate. Moreover, there might be a simultaneity problem in 
estimating the output equation, i.e. the real exchange rate and the demand shock might 
be correlated. Hence, the true value of  b  might be higher than its estimated value.  
 Table 1.E in Appendix E shows the macroeconomic stability of alternative 
monetary policy regimes when output is more sensitive to changes in the real exchange 
rate. For all countries, I consider the case where  b  is fifty percent higher than the 
estimated value reported in Table 2. According to Table 1.E, a higher value of  b  
reduces the variability of the real exchange rate and prices with exchange rate targeting. 
The reason for that lies in the effect that the wage setters respond to the level of activity 
in the economy (equation (9)), i.e. a higher  b  implies that wage setters only have to 
change their wages somewhat to reach a more stable aggregate demand.  
According to table 1.E, we can also see that the macroeconomic stability under 
flexible price level targeting and strict price level targeting is quite insensitive to 
changes in  b , but a higher value of  b  reduces the variability of the real exchange rate, 
the nominal exchange rate and prices with output gap targeting. The reason for that is 
that when monetary policy becomes more effective in affecting output (b  becomes 
higher), the central bank does not have to change the nominal exchange rate so much to 
reach output stability, still prices and exchange rates are substantially more volatile with 
output gap targeting than with strict or flexible price level targeting. This suggests that   24
when monetary policy becomes more effective in affecting demand (b  becomes 
higher), it is possible for the central bank regime to focus more on output stability under 





This paper has analyzed the stabilizing properties of alternative monetary policy regimes 
using a small, estimated open-economy model with forward-looking aggregate demand 
and supply, and with stylized realistic lags in the different transmission channels for 
monetary policy. In practice, there is a choice between two broad types of monetary 
policy regimes: a fixed exchange rate regime and a floating exchange rate regime. This 
paper studies how output, prices and exchange rates would have evolved for some 
countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom) with a pure floating exchange rate regime, if the central bank had had a 
different target. I consider four alternative targets for the central bank: (1) exchange rate 
peg, (2) strict price level targeting, (3) flexible price level targeting and (4) output gap 
targeting. 
Comparing the alternative regimes within the same numerical model makes the 
results subject to the Lucas’ critique. However, in each simulated policy regime, agents 
are assumed to form expectations consistent with that regime. Furthermore, the 
parameters in the theoretical model are such that they can reasonably be assumed to be 
independent of the policy regime. In this sense, the analysis is not subject to the Lucas 
critique.  
The results indicate that flexible or strict price level targeting yields the most 
stable macroeconomic environment in terms of price, output, real exchange rate and 
nominal exchange rate variability. An output gap target regime gives a more volatile 
price level but also a more volatile nominal exchange rate, since there is a strong 
monetary policy response to different shocks. The results also indicate that a strict 
exchange rate target would have implied more volatile output and higher price volatility 
for most countries. Somewhat surprisingly, a fixed exchange rate does not imply a more 
stable real exchange rate than a floating exchange rate regime. The reason is that a   25
central bank targeting the nominal exchange rate responds less vigorously to domestic 
disturbances than it does under a floating exchange rate regime.  
A more active counter-cyclical fiscal policy reduces both nominal and real 
variability under both exchange rate targeting and price level targeting. Thus, a more 
active fiscal policy makes it possible for the central bank regime to focus more on price 
stability under a floating exchange rate, without sacrificing stability in the real economy. 
The results also indicate that the actual monetary policy, for most countries, seems to be 
characterized by a flexible price level target, but there seem to be quite substantial 
differences in the choice of monetary policy regimes. For example, Japan seems to put 
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Appendix A: Derivation of the aggregate demand equation
15 
 
The aggregate demand equation used in the main text will be derived with some micro 
foundations in this appendix. Assume that domestic consumers have an additively 
separable CES utility function of aggregate real consumption with intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution,  s . Under the assumption that real consumption is 




) ( | | 1 r r c c s t t s t t t - - = - - + s ,                                                                                              (A.1) 
 
where  t c  denotes the deviation from the trend of aggregate real consumption and  r r t -  
is the real interest rate deviation from a long-run mean interest rate. Let aggregate 
consumption be a Cobb-Douglas function of consumption of domestic and foreign 
goods (that is, assuming a constant elasticity of substitution equal to unity).  Then, it 
follows that the consumer’s decision problem can be written as: 
 
max 
a a - *
-
1 ) ( ) ( t
d
t s t C C E                                                                                               (A.2) 
s.t   ) ( ) (
* *








t C and 
*
t C  denote the consumption of domestic and foreign goods, respectively, 
and 
*
t P  is the foreign price level measured in domestic currency. The CPI price level is 
defined as
a a - * =
1 ) ( ) ( t
d
t t P P P . Assuming monopolistic competition in the domestic 
economy, domestic prices are set as a mark-up on wages, i.e.  t
d
t W P =  (see e.g. Leitemo 
(2000)). Solving the problem, we get that domestic demand for domestically produced 




15See McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Svensson (1998) for a similar derivation of aggregate demand. 
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where  ) ( p w-  has been rewritten as the real exchange rate,  q, using equation (9) and 
(10).  Next, let us assume that changes in relative prices affect consumption with a lag 
of s quarters, because the consumption basket adjusts slowly to changes in relative 
prices.  After substituting (A.3) into the first-order condition (A.1), we get 
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where a zero-mean demand shock ,
d
t h ˆ , has been added (
d
t h ~  can be seen as a preference 





* * * + + = t s t t
d
t q f dy c J ,                                                                                               (A.6) 
 
where 
* f  is a measure of how sensitive the foreign demand for home goods is to 
changes in the real exchange rate,
*
t y  is the foreign output gap and 
*
t J  a demand shock. 
____________ 
16This assumption presumes that net foreign assets are stationary. Thus, I avoid the problem that a small 
open economy with infinitely lived consumers that can borrow at an exogenous world interest rate 
normally has non-stationary net foreign assets.    29
Foreign demand for home goods can be decomposed into two components:  s t q f -
* that 
depends on domestic monetary policy and 
* * *
t t t dy J h + =  that is independent of domestic 





t q f c h + = - .                                                                                                         (A.7) 
 
Public demand for domestically produced goods is defined as 
 
g
t s t t t y g h t ˆ ˆ | + = - ,                                                                                                           (A.8)                
 
where  t g is government expenditure (measured as deviations from the steady state), 
g
t h ˆ is a vector of other variables influencing fiscal policy (e.g. elections and government 
ideology) assumed to be independent of the monetary policy regime. Parameter  tˆis a 
measure of how sensitive government expenditure is to changes in the output gap. Total 





t t c n g n c n y
* + + = 3 2 1 .                                                                                             (A.9) 
 
1 n  is the share of private domestic demand,  2 n  the share of public demand and  3 n  the 
share of foreign demand in total aggregate demand. Substituting  (A.5), (A.7) and (A.8) 
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- - + - - ,                                                                 (A.10) 
 
where s g 1 n = , ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 3 2 1
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Appendix B: Data Sources and Definitions 
 
The data set covers Australia (1984:1-2000:2), Canada (1970:1-2000:2), Japan (1974:1-
2000:2), New Zealand (1985:1-2000:2), Sweden (1993:1-2000:2), Switzerland (1974:1-
2000:2) and the United Kingdom (1993:1-2000:2). The data are seasonally adjusted and 
all variables are expressed in logs. All data are collected from the OECD database Main 
Economic Indicator. 
 
Output (y): real GDP 
 
Domestic price level (p): domestic CPI-price level 
 
Domestic wages (w): wage rates (hourly rates in manufacturing) 
 
Government expenditure (g): total government expenditure 
 
Exchange rate (e): the exchange rate index is constructed as a competition-weighted 
sum of exchange rate series for ten OECD countries.  
 
Foreign price level (p*): the foreign CPI-price index is constructed using the same 
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Appendix C: Solving the model  
 
Under a floating exchange rate regime, the central bank’s problem is to choose { }
¥
=t e t t  
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t s t t s t s t s t t y p p e y h t b + + - + = - -
*
- - | ) ( ,                                                                                      
t k t s t k t t t by p w e + + = - + - | |                                                                                                (C.2)                                              
) )( 1 ( t t t t e p w p + - + =
* a a . 
 
Solving the problem, we get the optimal reaction function for the nominal exchange rate 
(written in terms of variables that all are exogenous to the monetary policy regime):  
     
t s t s t k t s t m t s t m t t
n
t t a a a a p p e e h h h 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | - - - - - = - + - + - +
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Appendix D: Reaction-function coefficients  






Strict price level 
targeting 
             
1 a   0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2 a   -0.65  1.81  1.60  1.18  1.89  0.94  1.61 
3 a   0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
4 a   12.47  3.09  6.02  8.68  2.88  1.82  8.98 
Flexible price level 
targeting 
             
1 a   6.05  2.18  4.57  5.93  2.43  1.72  6.58 
2 a   -1.04  -4.55  2.99  -6.05  -2.03  0.38  -9.42 
3 a   -0.69  -0.42  -0.88  -0.28  -0.24  -0.25  -0.70 
4 a   10.75  -0.07  -0.90  4.50  1.10  0.66  2.51 
Output  gap 
targeting 
             
1 a   9.88  2.61  4.73  6.57  3.43  2.78  6.87 
2 a   -0.97  -6.36  -3.56  -7.28  -3.91  -0.56  -11.03 
3 a   -1.14  -0.51  -0.92  -0.31  -0.33  -0.40  -0.74 
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Appendix E 
 
Table 1.E: Macroeconomic stability of alternative monetary policy regimes when output 
is more sensitive to changes in the real exchange rate (b fifty percent higher than the 
estimated value reported in Table 2). 








             
CPI  4.08  1.94  2.41  2.98  4.96  2.02  1.26 
Output   2.11  1.59  1.42  2.78  1.76  1.61  2.26 
Real exchange rate  5.55  1.60  12.94  3.79  5.35  2.71  4.71 
Exchange rate  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Strict price level 
targeting 
             
CPI  0.27  0.16  0.12  0.55  0.34  0.16  0.20 
Output   1.59  1.63  1.69  2.97  1.67  2.05  1.99 
Real exchange rate  5.24  1.31  7.56  4.18  4.35  2.23  3.28 
Exchange rate  4.81  2.62  5.14  3.43  5.10  3.17  1.46 
Flexible price 
level targeting 
             
CPI  1.43  0.64  0.27  1.62  2.69  0.94  0.38 
Output   1.21  1.47  1.51  2.25  1.40  1.34  1.66 
Real exchange rate  6.16  1.47  7.67  5.37  4.81  2.86  3.30 
Exchange rate  5.45  3.07  4.79  5.57  2.79  2.71  1.73 
Output gap 
targeting 
             
CPI  8.96  4.50  1.71  3.98  7.86  7.10  2.27 
Output   1.12  1.39  1.34  1.67  1.26  1.16  1.43 
Real exchange rate  5.08  1.58  7.92  4.54  4.34  3.31  3.40 
Exchange rate  11.52  5.63  6.41  6.75  5.91  9.67      3.22 
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Figure 1: Tradeoffs between output, price, the real exchange rate and nominal 
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